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I . INTRODUCTION
On 23 May 2013, President Obama formally acknowledged that the 
United States (US) had been taking “lethal, targeted action against al-Qaeda 
and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly 
referred to as drones,” and that it intended to continue doing so because these 
actions were “effective” and “legal.”1 When these words were pronounced, it 
was no secret that the US and other countries were embarked in the research, 
development and use of these unmanned systems.2 As a matter of fact, it was 
not the first time that high ranking officials of the US had acknowledged this, 
though little more was officially disclosed.3 After Obama’s words, opacity 
remains the policy concerning the frequency and scope of the use of drones 
by either the US or any other power that possesses them.4 Not only has the 
general public lacked enough information: “Even the other two branches of 
federal government … have reportedly not been fully informed of the details 
of the program.”5 Likewise, there seems to be a clear leap between what official 
spokespeople and apologetic scholars say on the one hand and what actually 
happens on the ground on the other.6
 The purpose of this paper is to contextualize the challenges that drones 
imply for international law, particularly in the realm of international human 
rights law. It has been rightly said that drones are simply new weapons 
that, as any other, must be used in accordance with existing law.7 In this 
respect, what the current drone proliferation brings about is the questioning, 
or a reappraisal, of some very core international law principles and norms; 
principles and norms that are fully in force and must be respected whether 
1. Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks of President Barack Obama (Washington, DC: The White 
House, 23 May 2013), online: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-
president-barack-obama> at 3.
2. See ABC News, “’This Week’ Transcript: Panetta” (Transcript) (Washington, DC: ABC News, 
2010), online: <http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/week-transcript-panetta/story?id=11025299> 
(last visited 2 July 2015). See also, Harold H Koh, Keynote Address of Harold H Koh, Legal Adviser 
of the Department of State, at the Annual meeting of the American Society of International Law, “The 
Obama Administration and International Law” (25 March 2010), online: <http://www.state.
gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm> (last visited 2 July 2015).
3. Ibid.
4. Eva Saiz, “Los drones, ¿una estrategia eficaz?”, (Madrid: El País, 10 August 2013), online: 
<http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2013/08/10/actualidad/1376151418_283948.html> 
(last visited 2 July 2015).’
5. Amnesty International, “Will I be Next?” US Drone Strikes in Pakistan (Amnesty International: 
London, 2013), at 50.
6. See, in this respect, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Covert Drone War Project” 
(2015) online: <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/> (last 
visited 2 July 2015).
7. Jacqueline L Hazelton, “Drones: What are They Good For?” (2013) 42:4/43:1 Parameters, at 
30;  International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), ICAO 
Doc. Car 328 AN/190 (2011), at 30, 33.
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one uses drones or any other armament. In this article, I shall provide an 
overview of current drone technology and how it is used; I shall subsequently 
present some of the challenges that these systems bring to international law 
in three arenas: the means of warfare; the prohibition of the use of force and 
its exceptions; and international human rights and international humanitarian 
law (IHL), particularly when drones are used for targeted killing.
II . DRONES: WHAT THEY ARE AND 
WHERE THEY ARE USED
In spite of the lack of transparency that surrounds this issue most authors 
coincide in the description of current and prospective drone technology as 
well as in its current proliferation. We know plenty of things about drones and 
where they are being used.
1. What are drones?
Drones are unmanned aircraft, controlled remotely and in real time by 
human operators.8 Though they are generally referred to as “unmanned aircraft 
vehicles” (UAV), some prefer to call them “remotely piloted aircraft systems” 
(RPAS): “RPAS are under control of a remote pilot-in-command for the entire 
flight under normal conditions and movements on the ground”.9 Irrespective 
of this terminological issue, “drones” are robot planes flown by ground-based 
pilots that represent the latest development so far in war-fighting technology, 
separating the warfighter from the consequences of his actions by as much as 
several thousand miles.10 Their nickname comes from the constant buzzing 
noise that some of them make in flight;11 they are extremely diverse: “there 
are currently dozens of types of drones in service, all of which differ greatly in 
terms of size, shape, weight, cost, range and capability.”12 The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) classification table shows this huge variety of 
UAV: Class I are those aircrafts that weigh less than 150 kg., among which 
there are different subtypes, including so-called “micro” UAVs with less 
than 2 kg that cannot fly higher than 200 feet. On the opposite side of the 
spectrum, Class III drones (Predators, Global Hawk, etc.) weigh more than 600 
kg (usually, several tones), can fly up to 65.000 feet high and have an almost 
8. Nils Melzer, Human Rights Implications of the usage of drones and unmanned robots in warfare, 
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, EXPO/B/DROI/2012/12 (Brussels: 
European Union, May 2013), at 9.
9. European RPAS Steering Group, Roadmap for the integration of Civil Remotely-Piloted Aircraft 
Systems into the European Aviation System, Final Report (June 2013), online: <http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/sectors/aerospace/uas/index_en.htm> (last visited 2 July 2015) at 5.
10. Dave Webb, Loring Wirbel, & Bill Sulzman, “From Space, No One Can Watch You Die” (2010) 
22:1 Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice at 31.
11. Chris Cole, Mary Dobbing, & Amy Hailwood, Convenient Killing: Armed Drones and the 
‘Playstation’ Mentality (London: The Fellowship of Reconciliation, 2010) at 6.
12. Melzer, supra note 8.
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unlimited mission radius.13 In total, the US alone may be flying 7,000 such 
devices during a natural year, with half-a-million-hour flight.14
Drones are being used in three different ways: first, when ground troops 
attack, or come under attack, armed drones are called in and use bombs 
and missiles in a similar way to other military aircraft; second, drones are 
on patrol in the skies of some countries (such as Afghanistan), observing the 
‘pattern of life’ on the ground 24 hours a day; and third, they are used in 
pre-planned missions to conduct targeted killings of suspected militants.15 
The first of these uses makes little difference with any other weapons, including 
traditional manned aircraft, in terms of international law: such use will or not 
be legal depending on general international humanitarian law parameters. In 
the second use (patrolling), drones need not even be armed and play only a 
surveillance function.16 This may not have in principle any humanitarian law 
implication, but does concern sovereignty and privacy issues, among others. 
As for the third use, it seems to have become the main use of combat drones, 
probably given their vulnerability (as of today) in conventional air warfare,17 
and where the focus of legality has been shed upon. To be clear, killing 
someone is legal or illegal (usually, illegal) irrespectively of the means used; 
but the fact that armed drones make it so much easier to kill people in remote 
areas has established a strong linkage between drones and targeted killing; a 
link that concerns both international human rights and humanitarian law.18
2. Historical overview
The technology to fly devices without a pilot exists since the immediate 
post Second World War. As a matter of fact, even during World War I the US 
Army and US Navy experimented with a remote control system invented by 
Sperrey and Hewitt that allowed war planes to fly without a pilot in order to, 
once they were loaded with explosives, direct them against the enemy. Had 
the system worked (the prototypes were highly unstable) they would have 
been closer to cruise missiles than to current drones, but the precedent shows 
13. Joint Air Power Competence Centre, “Strategic Concept of Employment for Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems in NATO” (Brussels: NATO, January 2010) at 6.
14. Cole, Dobbing, & Hailwood, supra note 11 at 7.
15. Ibid. at 6.
16. It is the case, for instance, of drones deployed by UN Peacekeepers in Congo. See 
Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, “The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (Drones) in United Nations 
Peacekeeping: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)” (2014) 18:13 ASIL Insights, 
online: <http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/13/use-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-drones-
united-nations-peacekeeping-case> (last visited 2 July 2015).
17. Javier Jordán & Josep Baqués, Guerra de Drones. Política, tecnología y cambio social en los nuevos 
conflictos (Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, 2014) at 126-128.
18. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or 
Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston Addendum, UNHRCOR, 14th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24 (2010) 
[UNHRC, “Report of the Special Rapporteur”] at para 27.
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how battlefields have been robotized the moment the adequate technology 
existed.19 As mentioned, actual “[d]rones were first used by the United States 
in the 1950s as target practice for fighter pilots. In the 1960s, they were used 
to spy over China and Vietnam, and also for surveillance in Bosnia and 
Kosovo in the 1990s.”20 Thus, during the Cold War drones were only used 
for surveillance purposes, but not only by the US; Israel, for instance, “used 
reconnaissance drones in Lebanon in 1982 and again in 1996 to guide piloted 
fighter bombers to targets.”21
Although the technology was developed earlier, the use of drones as 
weapons rather than as surveillance devices is very much linked to the US 
‘War on Terror’ following the 9/11 attacks and the appearance in this scene of a 
non-military actor, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Even if “[i]t was 
during NATO’s 1999 Kosovo campaign that Armed Forces started to think 
about the utility of strapping a missile to the UAV which led to the [Predator 
drone] armed with Hellfire missiles,”22 the fact is that “[t]he first time a missile 
was fired from an armed drone in an attack was in Afghanistan, less than a 
month after 9/11.”23 In a parallel process, during the Balkan Wars, and in order 
to skip the slow bureaucratic machinery of the Pentagon and its adjudicative 
processes, the US Government commissioned the CIA to create a surveillance 
drone. Even if the Gnat-750 produced by General Atomics for the CIA did 
not work very well, particularly in bad weather, this commission allowed 
the CIA to start its own relationship with the drone industry.24 In fact, “[t]he 
CIA allegedly carried out its first targeted drone killing in February 2002 in 
Afghanistan, where a strike killed three men near a former mujahedeen base 
called Zhawar Kili.”25 It was the beginning of a new attack vector that would 
become extremely popular only a few years later.
3. A Weapon of Choice
All authors agree that the Obama administration has produced a huge 
surge in the use of drones.26 According to different sources, when President 
Bush left the White House, the US had carried out at least 45 drone strikes,27 
19. Jordán & Baqués, supra note 17 at 15-16.
20. Webb, Wirbel, & Sulzman, supra note 10 at 31.
21. Cole, Dobbing, & Hailwood, supra note 11 at 6.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. at 7.
24. Jordán & Baqués, supra note 17, at 35.
25. James Cavallaro, Stephan Sonnenberg, & Sarah Knuckey, Living Under Drones: Death, Injury 
and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan, (Stanford, CA and New York, NY: 
Stanford Law School & NYU School of Law, Global Justice Clinic, 2012) at 9-10.
26. Andrew C Orr, “Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada” (2011) 44:3 Cornell 
Intl LJ 729 at 730.
27. Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, “The Year of the Drone: An Analysis of US Drone 
Strikes in Pakistan 2004-2010” (2010) 1 New America Foundation, at 1.
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or up to 52,28 in Pakistan alone. Before the end of his first term in office, 
President Obama had more than quintupled any of these figures, again in 
Pakistan alone.29
But the US is not the only actor using drones, armed or not. A recent 
report states that “approximately 50 States currently either possess drones 
or are in the process of developing or acquiring them.”30 Philip Alston was 
mentioning “only” 40 States in 2010,31 among them: “Israel, Russia, Turkey, 
China, India, Iran, the United Kingdom, and France either have or are seeking 
drones that also have the capability to shoot laser-guided missiles.”32 Dave 
Webb et al. add “Belarus, Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Georgia.”33 Curiously, 
there is contradiction among authors on some countries. For instance, there 
are allegations that Germany has already used armed drones,34 while other 
authors state that “Germany has made a request to purchase five Reapers and 
four mobile ground stations for $250 million, although they will not be armed 
as that step is not deemed to be acceptable in Germany.”35 Also, although Spain 
is not mentioned in these reports, local authors state that “Spanish industry 
has a wide investment area and there are currently more than 50 companies 
developing products and innovation for drones.”36 In the European Union 
(EU), “Italy, the Netherlands, and Poland are among other EU member states 
that are seeking or considering the purchase of armed drones, and European 
defence consortia are exploring the possibility of manufacturing both 
surveillance and armed UAVs in Europe.”37 In this last respect other authors 
say, citing market analysis firm Visiongain, that “[t]he US dominates the UAV 
market as it integrates these systems into all its armed services and at different 
levels [while] Israel is both a leading exporter of UAVs and a key market.”38
28. Stanford Law School and NYU School of Law, “Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and 
Trauma to Civilians from US Drone Practices in Pakistan” (2012), International Human 
Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School & Global Justice Clinic at NYU 
School of Law at 40.
29. Ibid. There were 300 attacks until the end of 2013, according to Jordàn & Baqués, supra note 
17, at 81; then, there were no attacks for months until 12 June 2014; cf. supra note 6, online: 
<http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/06/12/drone-strikes-resume-in-pakistan-after-five-
month-pause/> (last visited on 2 July 2015).
30. Melzer, supra note 8, at 7.
31. UN, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” supra note 18 at para 27.
32. Ibid.
33. Webb, Wirbel, & Sulzman, supra note 10 at 32.
34. Melzer, supra note 8 at 10.
35. Webb, Wirbel, & Sulzman, supra note 10 at 33. This can be due to the ‘No Combat Drones’ 
campaign launched by civil society groups at the announcement of German Defense Minister 
Thomas de Maizière of his wish to purchase UAVs for the Bundeswher.
36. Anna Escoda, “Los drones armados: una realidad en expansión” (2013) 47 Centre Delàs 
d’Estudis per la Pau at 12.
37. Anthony Dworkin, “Drones and Targeted Killings: Defining an EU Position” (2013) ECFR/84 
European Council on Foreign Relations (Policy Brief) at 3.
38. Cole, Dobbing, & Hailwood, supra note 21 at 11.
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Proliferation is not circumscribed to sovereign states. There are at least 
two reported cases where non-State actors have used, or tried to, armed 
drones. First, allegedly the private military company formerly known as 
Blackwater (subsequently Xe Services and Academi) was secretly hired by 
the CIA to target and kill Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda operatives in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan using drones.39 More recently, “in 2012, Hezbollah 
claimed responsibility for the launch of an Iranian manufactured Shahed-129 
reconnaissance and combat drone, which was shot down by Israel after flying 
25 miles into its territory.”40
The appeal of these weapons for state and non-state actors is self-evident: 
they imply no physical threat for its operator, who is miles away from 
the theater of operations; they seem to be more precise—and often more 
effective—than ordinary old-fashioned manned weapons.41 The first 
assertion cannot be put into question, although the ethical implications of 
such “distance” has deserved specific attention. According to some, drones 
would “lower the barrier to the killing of individuals,”42 and “there is a risk 
of developing a ‘PlayStation’ mentality to killing,”43 though these assertions 
are controversial and other authors explain how drone operators suffer higher 
levels of conflict-zone trauma than regular pilots.44 As for the alleged higher 
effectiveness of drones, in fact “the precision, accuracy, and legality of a drone 
strike depend on the human intelligence upon which the targeting decision is 
based;”45 an intelligence that is often “faulty.”46 Besides, accidents have been 
common,47 and, as any other system that depends on network technology, 
drones “are vulnerable to exploitation through, for example, hacking,”48 or 
“being hijacked and used as weapons against other airspace users or targets on 
39. Webb, Wirbel, & Sulzman, supra note 10 at 31. According to Apuuli, “UAVs in DRC are being 
operated by civilian contractors who are not UN peacekeepers, which raises issues under the 
customary law principle of distinction.” See Apuuli, supra note 16.
40. Melzer, supra note 8 at 8.
41. Hazelton, supra note 7 at 30.
42. Dworkin, supra note 37 at 4.
43. Cole, Dobbing, & Hailwood, supra note 11 at 4. The idea is taken from: UN, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur, supra note 18 at para 84.
44. Jordán & Baqués, supra note 17 at 156.
45. UN Human Rights Council, supra note 31 at para 82.
46. Ibid. at para 83.
47. According to Cole:
In July 2010, the Los Angeles Times revealed that Pentagon accident reports showed 
that thirty-eight Predator and Reaper drones have crashed during combat missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq and nine more during training on bases in the US, with each crash 
costing between US$ 3.7 million and $5 million. Altogether, the US Air Force says there 
have been 79 drone accidents costing at least US$ 1 million each.
See Cole, Dobbing, & Hailwood, supra note 11, at 14.
48. Ibid. at 14.
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the ground.”49 Other authors advocate that “US drone attacks exacerbate the 
threat of terrorism, both from a regional and global perspective, and intensely 
strengthen militancy and insurgency in the troubled Pak-Afghan region”.50 
Still, other benefits of drone systems are their mission flexibility, endurance, 
and persistence.51
Thus, drones pose a number of pressing issues for scholars and practitioners 
in terms of law, policy and ethics, among other areas. From the legal point of 
view alone, we are aware that the determination of the lawfulness of the use 
of drones cannot have a single, straightforward answer valid for all cases. On 
the contrary, such appraisal is often conditioned to the actual circumstances 
of each use. Notwithstanding, in the next sections of this article I shall try to 
provide some initial general answers to the legality of the use of drones in 
general, with a focus on combat drones, rather than surveillance ones.
4. Lethal autonomous weapons
Let us finish this introduction by explaining what will not be the focus of 
our research: lethal autonomous weapons. According to some authors, they 
are the inevitable next step in weapon/drone technology,52 and have already 
merited a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions.53 The existence of lethal autonomous weapons would 
imply that “targeting decisions would be taken by the robots themselves.”54 
Many processes are already automatic in the war industry, such as missile 
defense strikes against foreign armed attacks. The current challenge 
seems to be whether a robot will in the future be capable to take a human 
life autonomously, while at the same time respecting the limits set out by 
international humanitarian law, and, if so, if humanity should allow this to 
happen. (I believe that no automatic system will ever be able to make the fine 
judgments that interpretation of law, including humanitarian law, requires.55 
Hence, for ethical but also for purely legal reasons, these weapons should be 
49. European RPAS Steering Group, supra note 9 at 12.
50. Sikander Ahmed Shah, “War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, 
and the Legality of US Drone Attacks in Pakistan” (2010) 9 Wash U Global Stud L Rev at 124. 
The ICG Report demystifies “the actual benefit to extremist groups, including in terms of 
recruitment” that appears to be “minimal.” See International Crisis Group (ICG), “Drones: 
Myths and Reality in Pakistan” (2013) Asia Report No. 247 at 23. All in all, though, ICG’s 
assessment is that “the best counter-terrorism in FATA” is “the rule of law” (International Crisis 
Group, at 31-33).
51. NATO, “Strategic Concept of Employment for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in NATO” (2010), 
online: <http://www.japcc.org/wp-content/uploads/UAS_CONEMP.pdf> at 2.
52. Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, “Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers” (December 
2012) Policy Review.
53. UN, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof 
Heyns, UNHRCOR, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (9 April 2013).
54. Ibid. at para 27.
55. Jordán & Baqués, supra note 17 at 139.
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banned all along.56) More generally, ICAO has excluded fully autonomous 
aircraft from their flying permits, at least for the time being:
All UA, whether remotely-piloted, fully autonomous or a combination 
thereof, are subject to the provisions of Article 8.57 Only the remotely-piloted 
aircraft (RPA), however, will be able to integrate into the international civil 
aviation system in the foreseeable future. The functions and responsibilities 
of the remote pilot are essential to the safe and predictable operation of the 
aircraft as it interacts with other civil aircraft and the air traffic management 
(ATM) system. Fully autonomous aircraft operations are not being considered 
in this effort, nor are unmanned free balloons nor other types of aircraft which 
cannot be managed on a real-time basis during flight.58
But again, this is not the topic of this article, which is focused on weapons 
that are under the permanent control of an, albeit distant, individual.
III . DRONE SYSTEMS AS MEANS OF WARFARE
One of the core principles in the law of war, as set out in Article 35 of 
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, is that “in any armed conflict, the 
right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods and means of warfare 
is not unlimited.”59 Drones being a relatively new means of warfare, it seems 
relevant to check whether they meet the requirements of lawful weapons 
(under the Article 35 definition).As a matter of fact, there are few rules in 
customary international humanitarian law concerning weapons. Basically, 
as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has established, 
humanitarian law says that the “use of means and methods of warfare which are 
of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited” 
(rule 70); and that the “use of weapons which are by nature indiscriminate is 
prohibited” (rule 71).60 Thus, any weapon that necessarily causes such excessive 
56. Peter Asaro, “On banning autonomous weapon systems: human rights, automation, 
and the dehumanization of lethal decision-making” (2012) 94:886 International Review of 
the Red Cross 687.
57. Article 8 of the ICAO Convention states: “No aircraft capable of being flown without a 
pilot shall be flown without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special 
authorization by that State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization”. See 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944, 15 UNTS 295 at art 8.
58. International Civil Aviation Organization, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS),” ICAO Doc. 
Cir 328, AN/190 (2011) at 3.
59. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), 8 June 1977, online at < https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750044?OpenDocument> 
[Protocol I] at art 35.
60. Jean-Marie Henckaert & Louise Doswald-Beck, International Committee of the Red Cross: 
Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume 1: Rules, (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009) at 237-250.
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injuries or suffering or cannot be addressed to a specific military target should 
be considered prohibited and never be used. It is important to note that for a 
weapon to be prohibited those negative effects must be inherent or co-natural 
rather than incidental.61
On top of these rather broad provisions, specific weapons usually meeting 
the above standards have been forbidden through specific treaties, most of 
which can currently be considered a part of international customary law. 
These include poisonous, biological and chemical weapons, expanding and 
explosive bullets, landmines, among others.62 Armed drones have not been the 
object of any such treaty, nor are there any common international standards 
about their design, manufacture or stockpiling, let alone about their actual 
use; this means that the only standards that can be put forward are those 
established in Rules 70 and 71 cited above.
It would seem hard to argue that drone systems are “indiscriminate in 
nature.” On the contrary, they are praised for their precision: “[u]nmanned 
drones provide a precise method for discriminating between the civilian 
population and the lawful target, thus decreasing the overall casualties of an 
attack;”63 they are “claimed to do less collateral damage.”64 The problem of 
such assertions comes when one analyses the immense percentage of erred 
hits by drones, that is, the amount of civilian casualties caused by drone 
strikes. According to a conservative estimate, “the 114 reported drone strikes 
in northwestern Pakistan from 2004 [to 2010] have killed between 830 and 1,210 
individuals, of whom 550 to 850 were described as militants in reliable press 
accounts … Thus, the true civilian fatality rate since 2004 … is approximately 
32 per cent.”65 Other sources lower the “success percentage of the US Predator 
strikes…to not more than six per cent”66 and affirm that “[w]ithout a pilot, 
who potentially has a better ability to distinguish between civilian and militant 
targets at the time of a strike, drones lack the capability to, on site, factor in 
the fact that civilians and militants reside co-terminously in the vicinity of 
the planned attack.”67 According to other sources, many of those “militants” 
were in fact civilians that the US targeted in “signature strikes” that I shall 
61. Melzer, supra note 8 at 27.
62. Henckaert & Doswald-Beck, supra note 60 at Part IV.
63. Kenneth Anderson, Targeted killing in US counterterrorism strategy and law, Working Paper 8 
(2009), online (SSRN): <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1415070>.
64. Hazelton, supra note 7 at 30.
65. Bergen & Tiedemann, supra note 27 at 1, 3. Note that this is a serious, albeit very conservative 
estimate, of authors that claim that “Drone attacks in the tribal region seem to remain the only 
viable option for the United States to take on the militants based there who threaten the lives of 
Afghans, Pakistanis, and Westerners alike” (Bergen and Tiedemann, at 6). Thus, no ‘pacifists’ or 
anti-drone chums.
66. Shah, supra note 50 at 126.
67. Ibid. Improved data in the last few months seems to be due to a new cheating approach of 
the administration: “the current [US] administration seems to have introduced a method for 
counting civilian casualties which automatically presumes that all males of fighting age present 
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discuss later,68 and, in fact, “the United States does not offer clear information 
on how they recognize civilians and ‘combatants’ in drone strikes.”69 Reports 
by Amnesty International (on Pakistan) and Human Rights Watch (on Yemen) 
also show an immense ratio of civilian casualties, probably due to wrong 
intelligence and/or a too wide a concept of “combatant.”70 Authors argue that 
drone targeting is necessarily based on intelligence obtained on the ground,71 
which can sometimes be biased by political rivalries alien to the goals of the 
attacking power: “[r]esidents in FATA also believe that informants possibly 
provide false information and exploit their position to settle vendettas with 
local rivals.”72 But, this is not a problem about accuracy of the weapon, but 
about the precision of the necessary intelligence to use it.
Likewise, as for the prohibition of excessively injurious weapons, authors 
tend to agree that:
Where armed drone operations have inflicted excessive harm on targeted 
persons, the reason lay not in the excessively injurious nature of the weapon 
used, but in the failure of the human planners and operators to comply with 
the prohibition of attacks against persons hors de combat and, thus, in a 
failure to respect the principle of distinction rather than the prohibition of 
unnecessary suffering.73
Thus, as with any other “bomb,” missiles launched by drones will kill, 
maim, and produce other injuries on individuals that are “reasonable.” But 
again, there would be something unique to drones and how they are used 
that is “extremely insidious.” According to the NYU-Stanford ‘Living Under 
Drones’ project:
The presence of drones and capacity of the US to strike anywhere at any 
time led to constant and severe fear, anxiety, and stress, especially when 
taken together with the inability of those on the ground to ensure their own 
safety. Further, those interviewed stated that the fear of strikes undermines 
people’s sense of safety to such an extent that it has at times affected 
their willingness to engage in a wide variety of activities, including social 
in the area of a planned attack are combatants, unless intelligence collected after [sic!] the attack 
proves otherwise.” See Melzer, supra note 61, at 25; and ICG, supra note 50 at 10.
68. Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, & Knuckey, supra note 25 at 48-52.
69. Alcides Eduardo dos Reis Peron, “The ‘Surgical’ Legitimacy of Drone Strikes? Issues of 
Sovereignty and Human Rights in the Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems in Pakistan” (2014) 
7:4 JSS 81 at 86.
70. Amnesty International, supra note 6; Human Rights Watch, “Between a Drone 
and Al-Qaeda” The Civilian Costs of US Targeted Killings in Yemen” (22 October 
2013), online: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/10/22/between-drone-and-al-qaeda/
civilian-cost-us-targeted-killings-yemen>.
71. Hazelton, supra note 7 at 8.
72. ICG, supra note 50 at 11.
73. Melzer, supra note 8 at 28.
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gatherings, educational and economic opportunities, funerals, and that fear 
has also undermined general community trust. In addition, the US practice 
of striking one area multiple times, and its record of killing first responders, 
makes both community members and humanitarian workers afraid to assist 
injured victims.74
Certainly, the excessive psychological effects of drones on civilians 
and militants alike is not a matter of the technology itself but rather about 
how it is used in that particular theater of operations (specifically Federally 
Administered Tribal Area (FATA) regions in Pakistan). Having said that, 
it could be argued that since drones are used primarily in this fashion 
(permanent surveillance and targeted killing),75 they can meet the standard 
of customary international law as a weapon normally causing “superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering.” Although it is an interesting argument, it 
must be admitted that the International Court of Justice set a high standard 
for these considerations when it found itself incapable of determining that 
nuclear weapons, probably the most clear-cut example of a weapon that is 
indiscriminate in nature and necessarily causes superfluous injuries and 
unnecessary suffering, were intrinsically unlawful under international 
humanitarian law.76 Thus, it is unlikely that such reasoning would succeed 
before any jurisdictional forum.
In order to ascertain whether drones are per se lawful weapons, this 
technology should have undergone a verification process in accordance to 
Article 36 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means 
or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to 
determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be 
prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable 
to the High Contracting Party.77
This obligation is fairly loose. In the worst case scenario, not compliance 
could be considered a violation of treaty law, but the fact is that the ICRC 
itself has not included anything similar to this duty within its compilation 
of customary international humanitarian law.78 In particular, as the US is not 
74. Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, & Knuckey, supra note 25 at 55. Journalist David Rohde, in his account 
of being held hostage by the Taliban, wrote that “the buzz of a distant propeller is a constant 
reminder of imminent death” (quoted by ICG, supra note 70 at 11).
75. Cheri Kramer, “The Legality of Targeted Drone Attacks as US Policy” (2011) 9:2 Santa Clara 
J of Intl L at 380. This being so because, as mentioned earlier, current drone technology makes 
them very vulnerable in conventional air warfare.
76. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) (8 July 1996), ICJ 
Reports 1996, 226.
77. ICRC, Protocol I, supra note 59 at art 36.
78. Ibid.
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a party to the Protocol, it has no direct duties in this respect. On top of that, 
Jean Pictet acknowledges that this internal determination of the legality of a 
new weapon cannot be supervised by any international body and that even 
if the State finds that such new weapon is illegal under the criteria set up in 
Article 35, it is not obliged to disclose such information.79 In other words, the 
fact that there is no way to know whether the different states involved in the 
development of drone technology have or have not taken the features of such 
weapons into consideration in terms of them being necessarily indiscriminate 
or excessively harmful cannot be considered per se a violation of Article 36.
Moving a step forward however, drone technology is fit to be combined 
with other weapons that could be prohibited.80 For instance, the UK Ministry 
of Defense is said of having considered the miniaturization of systems that 
would enable future “micro-drones” to be weaponized to act as “antipersonnel 
devices, presumably by way of poisonous injection.”81 We fully agree with 
Melzer when he argues that “the general prohibitions and restrictions of 
weapons law apply fully also to all types of weapons which may be mounted 
on drones.”82 But then again, this is nothing specific of drone technology. If a 
poisonous weapon, a chemical weapon, or a landmine was to be thrown from 
a conventional manned airplane, it would very probably be an illegal act of 
war, but it would not ipso facto make the aircraft technology illegal.
IV. THE USE OF COMBAT DRONES BEYOND 
NATIONAL TERRITORY: 
CONSENT AND SELF DEFENSE
Before moving into the specific use of drones in targeted killing, a 
word seems necessary about the implication of the use of drones in general 
international law. In principle, not much should be needed since there are 
little specificities in this field as compared to any other technology.
1. The role of consent of the territorial State
The first issue, of state consent, is raised both in the context of surveillance 
drones, as well as drones used for targeted killings, within or without 
an armed conflict, as long as they happen beyond national jurisdiction. 
It relates to sovereignty over airspace, an area that is globally acknowledged 
79. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (8 June 1977), Comments, online: <http://www.
icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?viewComments=LookUpCOMART&articleUNID= 
FEB84E9C01DDC926C12563CD0051DAF7> at para 1479-1482 (last visited 2 July 2015).
80. Melzer, supra note 8 at 10.
81. Ibid. at 9; Jordán & Baqués, supra note 17 at 37.
82. Ibid. at 27.
On the Implications of the Use of Drones in International Law   133
to belong exclusively to the territorial State.83 In this respect, it is true that 
the international community has given itself a number of instruments that 
tend to fulfill the “freedom of the skies”, but such freedoms only apply for 
commercial aviation.84 On the contrary, “aircraft used in military, customs, 
and police services,” are not covered by the 1944 Chicago Convention on 
International Civil Aviation and require special agreement for flight.85 The 
non-consensual flight of any aircraft for whichever purpose over territorial 
airspace is a violation of State’s sovereignty, that is, the territorial State must 
give a “valid consent” over the flight of a drone (or any other flying device) in 
order for it to be lawful.86
When we refer to combat drones using force, this alleged preclusion 
of wrongfulness must face the fact that Article 26 of the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility limits this to acts of states which are not in violation of 
obligations “arising under a peremptory norm of general international law,” 
including the use of force.87 Notwithstanding, in the best known cases of use 
of drones, armed force is not used “against a State”, but against certain armed 
elements “within a State” that fight against its government and thus, allegedly, 
have its consent. For instance, in the case of Afghanistan, it has been argued 
that a coalition formed by Taliban and al-Qaeda elements is at war (in a non-in-
ternational armed conflict) with the Afghan Government, which is supported 
by NATO (ISAF).88 Thus, there is ‘consent’ by the Afghan Government to 
foreign powers exerting force in its territory, including flying and using armed 
drones.89 The same seems to be applicable in other theaters since, according to 
some sources, US “drone operations [in Yemen] are executed in coordination 
with the [recognized] governments of Yemen and Saudi Arabia.”90
However, one specific case shows the difficulties in establishing the 
real existence of such consent: the notorious strikes in certain remote areas 
of Pakistan (FATA) systematically hit by US drones since 2004. According to 
83. Rebeca MM Wallace & Olga Martin Ortega, International Law, 6th ed (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2009) at 113.
84. Chia-Jui Cheng, The Use of Air and Outer Space Cooperation and Competition: Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Air and Outer Space at the Service of World Peace and Prosperity, Held in 
Beijing from 21-23 August 1995 (Dordrecth: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998).
85. ICAO Convention, supra note 58 at 15, art 3.
86. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, International Law Commission, UNGA 
Resolution 56/83 (12 December 2001) at art 20.
87. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 2001, 
(2001) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol II, Part 2 [Draft Articles] at art 26.
88. Kramer, supra note 75 at 382-83.
89. Obviously, the fact that the Security Council has authorized the deployment of ISAF may 
render the issue of consent by the Afghani Government irrelevant. But since the drone strikes 
seems to be carried out not by ISAF proper but directly by the US Government - and in fact not 
by its military, but by a civil agency (CIA) - the fact that the Afghani Government agrees on such 
strikes becomes important again.
90. Saiz, supra note 4.
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one source, “Pakistan initially appeared to support US strikes covertly. From 
2004 through at least 2007, the Pakistani government claimed responsibility 
for attacks that had, in fact, been conducted by the US, thus allowing the US 
to deny any involvement.”91 According to Amnesty International, “former 
President and Army Chief Pervez Musharraf acknowledged that he had 
given the USA qualified permission to undertake some US drone strikes in 
the Tribal Areas during his tenure, which ended in August 2008.”92 As strikes 
have increased, however, so has the Pakistani public’s opposition to them, 
although this has not impeded the Pakistani government to adopt a position 
of “tacit support” to US drone strikes.93 According to a local international 
lawyer, “albeit unofficially, there does exist a kind of a defective ‘go ahead.’”94 
Other authors disagree:
The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Yousuf Raza Gilani, has on numerous 
occasions officially condemned such attacks, and has termed them a violation 
of the sovereignty of Pakistan and a dangerous course of action that fuels 
militarism. He has urged the US administration to immediately bring a halt 
to halt such operations.95
According to a report of the International Crisis Group, “Almost nine 
years after the US conducted its first drone strike in [the] FATA, Pakistan has 
yet to lodge a formal complaint to the UN Security Council,” and “continues 
to clear airspace for the drones” which “the Obama administration interprets 
as tacit consent.”96
Even if such “tolerance” exists, “[t]he informal go ahead is not being 
viewed as sufficient by international lawyers to confer … legitimacy.”97 
91. Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, & Knuckey, supra note 25 at 15. In 2008, according to cables released 
by WikiLeaks, Pakistan’s Prime Minister reportedly told US Embassy officials, “I don’t care if 
they [conduct strikes] as long as they get the right people. We’ll protest in the National Assembly 
and then ignore it.” In 2009, both Pakistan’s Prime Minister and its Foreign Minister publicly 
celebrated the drone strike that killed Baitullah Mehsud, the alleged leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban, 
Pakistan (TTP), an armed group that launches terrorist attacks within Pakistan (ibid.).
92. Amnesty International, supra note 5 at 53.
93. Ibid.
94. Ahmar Bilal Soofi, “A CRSS Discussion Forum Reports. The Legality of Drone Attacks” 
(Remarks of Mr. Ahmar Bilal Soofi at Centre for Research and Security Studies (CRSS)) 
(Islamabad, 30 June 2010), online: < http://crss.pk/downloads/Events%20and%20Media/
CRSS-Roundtables/Legality-of-Drone-Attacks/The%20Legality%20of%20Drone%20Attacks.pdf>.
95. Shah, supra note 50 at 114. Amnesty International describes also this official rejection of 
US policy. According to a spokesperson of the Pakistan government quoted in their report: 
“drone strikes are violative of Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, are violative of 
international law and are counterproductive because they do not serve their purpose but create 
a thirst for revenge.” See Amnesty International, supra note 6, at 53.
96. ICG, supra note 52 at 5.
97. Soofi, supra note 93.
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It is true that usually consent is not formalistic in international law,98 but 
sometimes it is, particularly when the Chicago Convention calls for a “special 
agreement,” or when we are dealing with the use of armed or police force in 
the territory of a third country. In respect of Article 20 of the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility, the International Law Commission (ILC) has said that 
“certain modalities need to be observed for consent to be considered valid. 
Consent must be freely given and clearly established.”99 It is beyond doubt that 
the government’s consent requires an unambiguous, if not written and formal, 
agreement. This does not seem the case in Pakistan, where “while responding 
to reports claiming that Pakistan had privately backed such operations and 
allowed the use of its airfields, the Prime Minister categorically denied any 
such agreement between the two nations.”100 Moreover, it should be noted 
that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has been very strict in considering 
the scope of a presumed “consent” to use force in one’s territory against a 
non-state actor. In the Congo-Uganda case, the Court draws its attention to the 
fact that consent “given to Uganda to place its forces in the DRC, and to engage 
in military operations, was not open-ended,” and that, at a certain point, “any 
earlier consent by the DRC to the presence of Ugandan troops on its territory” 
had been withdrawn.101
Consent may thus be a good argument in terms of the legality of overflying 
someone else’s airspace and even using armed force in it, as long as it is validly 
and clearly expressed and covers precisely the whole range of the otherwise 
illegal act.102 This consent, however, does not validate whatever happens in 
such airspace and territory and, in fact, it may also imply the co-responsibility 
of the territorial State in whichever breaches of international law the US or 
another power may be committing in their territory.103
2. Self-defense
This leads to the second argument and its implications: that the US, in 
countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, and other theaters would 
be exercising its “inherent right to self-defense,” as set out in Article 51 of 
the UN Charter “against Al-Qaeda, a non-State actor.”104 According to 
President Barack Obama:
98. Wallace and Ortega, supra note 83 at 4 and 15.
99. Draft Articles, supra note 87at 73.
100. Shah, supra note 50 at 114. Shah adds: “The legislative Parliamentary Committee on National 
Strategy echoed the same sentiment, calling for an immediate end to US attacks on Pakistani soil 
and terming them a violation of the nation’s territorial integrity” (ibid.).
101. Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), [2005] ICJ Rep 168 [Congo-Uganda] at paras 52-53.
102. Per Draft Articles, supra note 87 at art 20.
103. Amnesty International, supra note 5 at 54-55.
104. Melzer, supra note 8 at 22; Andrew C Orr, “Unmanned, Unprecedented and Unresolved: 
The Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan under International Law” (2011) 44 Cornell 
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Under domestic law, and international law, the United States is at war 
with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces … a war waged 
proportionally, in last resort, and in self-defense.105
This argument would be put forward in response to the obvious 
perception that the use of armed drones in third states constitutes, in itself, an 
act of aggression or at least an armed attack. An armed attack that (in their 
understanding of reality) would be justified as a response to the 9/11 attacks 
or to international terrorism in general, or to terrorism directed against US 
interests, as part of the infamous “Global War on Terror.”106 Such reasoning 
implies a serious misunderstanding of core norms of international law.
Bombing someplace or someone with an armed device such as drones falls 
fully prima facie in the definition of “aggression” agreed by the international 
community in UN General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974.107 
Among the different acts that constitute an “aggression,” this includes: “[b]
ombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another 
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another 
State.”108 More recently, an amendment to the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court has confirmed this wording.109 Though combat drones are 
not explicitly mentioned (no weapon is) their strikes clearly fall within the 
concept of “bombardment.” The fact that they often belong to the CIA rather 
than to the military does not preclude it from being considered an “act of 
State.”There is a strong presumption that a first use of force is illegal under 
contemporary international law;110 meaning that the burden of proof that such 
strike was justified under self-defense belongs to the State using armed force. 
In this respect, Resolution 3314 (XXIX) defines that “the first use of armed 
force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie 
Intl LJ 729, at 738. The same has been argued for instance by Israel in relation to the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories, but the International Court of Justice rejected the argument in its Wall 
Opinion (Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(Advisory Opinion), 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports, 136 at para 139):
The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 
and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the construction of 
the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus different 
from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), and 
therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support of its claim to be 
exercising a right of self-defense. Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 of the 
Charter has no relevance in this case.
105. Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 1 at 3.
106. Dworkin, supra note 37 at 5.
107. Definition of Aggression, GA Res 3314 (XXIX), UNGAOR, 29th Sess, Supp 31, 142 UN 
Doc A/0631 (1974).
108. GA Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 106 at art 3(b) [Annex].
109. See (the new) art 8 bis of the ICC Statute, inserted by resolution RC/Res.6 of 11 June 2010.
110. Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1963) at 214.
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evidence of an act of aggression.”111 If the US truly believes that its strikes in 
different theaters are acts of self-defense, it should notify the Security Council. 
According to Dinstein, following the ICJ Nicaragua-US case, “[t]he duty of 
reporting becomes a substantive condition and a limitation on the exercise 
of self-defense.”112 There is no news about the United States reporting “its 
carrying out drone attacks on Pakistani territory to the S.C. [sic] as an exercise 
of this right of self-defense as mandated by article 51.”113
Neither the drafting history nor customary law suggests that the principle 
of self-defense could be applied to any actor different than sovereign states. 
As a matter of fact, the ICJ “has never authorized another State to intervene by 
the use of force against non-State groups in violation of another sovereign’s 
space.”114 For instance, when considering allegations of Uganda acting in 
self-defense against a non-State actor in the Congo-Uganda case, the ICJ refused 
it, for Uganda had “not ever claimed that it had been subjected to an armed 
attack by the armed forces of the DRC [or] by armed bands or irregulars sent 
by the DRC or on behalf of the DRC.”115
Thus, there is no such thing in international law as “self-defense against 
terrorist groups,” even when territorial states are not very collaborative. In this 
respect, could anyone imagine the United Kingdom bombing the Republic of 
Ireland during the IRA years (or bombing the US, by the way, where the IRA 
used also to obtain funding); or Spain doing the same in France in the height 
of ETA’s power?
Self-defense is a necessary and proportional armed response to an armed 
attack.116 Even if anticipatory self-defense may be permissible under international 
law,117 in the sense of reacting to an attack that has already started but not yet 
hit, so-called pre-emptive self-defense, (attacking a State that may or may not 
carry out an attack in the future), is an act of aggression on its own.118 Whether 
they are a reprisal for the 9/11 attacks, or aimed at exterminating al-Qaeda’s 
leadership in order to prevent future terrorist attacks, US drone attacks in 
Pakistan, Yemen, and other theaters are “preemptive in nature,”119 not acts of 
self-defense. If they respond to prior or potential terrorist attacks (or “a use of 
force of lesser gravity,” in the terms used by the ICJ in the Nicaragua-US case), 
111. GA Res 3314 (XXIX), supra note 106 at art 2 [Annex].
112. Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense, 4th ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), at 216.
113. Shah, supra note 66 at 115.
114. Peron, supra note 68 at 88. This is acknowledged by authors like Orr, supra note 104 at 738.
115. Congo–Uganda, supra note 99 at para 146.
116. See UN Charter at art 51, as interpreted by the International Court of Justice in Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, 27 
June 1986, ICJ Reports [Nicaragua-US] at para 194.
117. Orr, supra note 104 at 740.
118. Jaume Saura, “Legalidad de la Guerra moderna a propósito de la invasión de Irak” in Concha 
Roldan et al., Guerra y paz en nombre de la política (Madrid: Calamar Ediciones, 2004) at 126-128.
119. Shah, supra note 50 at 116.
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they cannot “give rise to an entitlement to take … countermeasures involving 
the use of force”.120
Terrorism is a matter of public order and law enforcement, which should be 
addressed by police means and due process;121 not of warfare.122 Transnational 
or international terrorism is no different, as the 13 treaties adopted under the 
auspices of the UN and its agencies against this phenomenon show.123 It is to be 
addressed via international police and judicial cooperation, not by the use of 
armed force, notwithstanding the gravity of the terrorist attack:124 “terrorism is 
best countered by rule of law both within and between countries because the 
global nature of terrorism requires international cooperation.”125
International terrorism is a threat to peace and security, but terrorist 
attacks are not armed attacks in the appropriate sense. The fight against 
terrorism requires international cooperation and institutional action, not 
self-defense. From a global perspective, UN Security Council Resolution 1269 
(1999) was meant to be the roadmap of the international community to fight 
international terrorism and it indeed established that terrorism “endangers 
the lives and well-being of individuals worldwide as well as the peace and 
security of all states.”126 But this resolution is neither framed in Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter,127 nor does it refer to the right to self-defense.128 Two years 
later, SC Resolution 1368 (2001) condemned the 9/11 attacks “[like] any act of 
international terrorism, as a threat to international peace and security,” but 
neither this nor further Resolutions establishing international terrorism to be a 
“threat to international peace and security” have considered “terrorist attacks” 
as “armed attacks” in the sense of Article 51 of the UN Charter.129 There is little 
120. Dinstein, supra note 111 at para 249.
121. Michael L Gross, “Assassination and Targeted Killing: Law Enforcement, Execution, or 
Self-Defense” (2006) 23:3 J of Appl Philosophy 329.
122. Shah, supra note 50 at 128.
123. See their text and status online: <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/studies/
page2_en.xml> (last visited 2 July 2015).
124. See a description of the international treaty framework against terrorism in: Jaume Saura, 
“Some Remarks on the Use of Force Against Terrorism in Contemporary International Law and 
the Role of the Security Council” (2003) 26:1 Loy LA Intl & Comp L Rev at 8-13.
125. Kramer, supra note 75 at 391.
126. SC Res 1269, UNSCOR, 54th Sess, 4053rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1269 (1999).
127. I.e., “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of 
Aggression.” Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Can TS 1945 No. 7 [UN 
Charter] at Ch 7.
128. Saura, supra note 118 at 17.
129. Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) [on Threats to international peace and security caused 
by terrorist acts], SC Res 1368, UNSCOR, 4370th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1368 (2001), and Security 
Council Resolution 1373 (2001) [on Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts], 
SC Res 1373, UNSCOR, 4385th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (2001) are both ambiguous in this 
respect as they “remind” in their respective preambles about the “inherent” right of all States 
to self-defense.
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evidence, beyond US statements and practice, of the international community 
accepting that a terrorist attack is to be considered an armed attack.130
In an unbelievable twist of the self-defense argument, certain authors and 
officials seem to affirm that Article 51 of the Charter—on the prior, inherent, 
right to self-defense—allow strikes against the specific individual who 
is “attacking” (or more often, is about to attack) US interests. Thus, “…The 
ongoing threat from militants in Pakistan also justifies the use of anticipatory 
force against persons planning or working towards future attacks against the 
United States.”131
There is here a tremendous conflation between a norm of international 
law, dealing with international subjects, and national criminal law, where 
an individual can defend him or herself from the attack of a thug or “law 
enforcement officers [may use] lethal force when either their lives of the 
lives of bystanders and in immediate danger.”132 This is a confusion that, 
willingly,133 forgets that, if we are in the realm of national criminal law, then 
the matter turns to be one of “enforcement,” not of “use of force”, and thus 
the law of human rights is fully applicable:134 “the domestic criminal system 
of states should be employed to punish reprehensible behavior carried out by 
non-state actors.”135 In this framework, the UN Basic Principles on the Use of 
Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials provide very reasonable 
guidelines,136 for instance that the “intentional lethal use of firearms may only 
be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life.”137 This leads us 
irremediably to the discussion of the legal qualification of targeted killing.
130. Note that huge terrorist attacks committed against countries different from the US (Indonesia, 
2002; Spain, 2004; UK, 2005, etc.) by foreign terrorists have never taken these countries to 
threat or use force against the countries from which these individuals came from or where they 
prepared their attacks. On the contrary, they were arrested, prosecuted and convicted in a fair 
trial, in accordance with domestic law.
131. Orr, supra note 104 at 741. President’s Obama address is ambiguous in this respect as he talks 
about targeting “al-Qaeda and its associated forces” (thus, ‘groups’), but immediately refers 
to ‘individuals’ and ‘terrorists’ “who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American 
people.” Office of the Press Secretary, supra note 1 at 3.
132. Gross, supra 121 at 324-25.
133. According to Dworkin, “[a] possible explanation for the apparent ambiguity in the US 
position is that there were disagreements within the administration about the scope of the 
alleged armed conflict, and that the formula of alternative justifications was chosen to allow 
flexibility between differing views.” See Dworkin, supra note 37 at 5.
134. Others argue that “the fundamental flaw of this argument in its inherent conflation of jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello.” See Kramer, supra note 74 at 395.
135. Shah, supra note 50 at 128.
136. Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials, “Eighth United 
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders” (Havana: 27 
August—7 September 1990), UN Doc A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (1990) Ch 2 at 112.
137. Ibid.
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3. Targeted killing by drones
Drone technology poses a number of challenges to a wide variety of issues 
in international human rights, for instance for privacy, if they are used as a 
method of surveillance or espionage in peaceful and democratic contexts,138 as 
well as international humanitarian law for classic jus in bello matters, such as the 
compliance with the principle of distinction in specific operations. But drones 
have attracted media attention and become controversial for targeted killing: 
again, though targeted killing is neither specific nor first appeared with this 
technology,139 it has known a huge surge since the inception and development 
of armed drones. In Pakistan, for instance, “[t]he primary purpose of the US 
in carrying out these drone attacks is, as seen by many, an attempt to kill 
members of both al-Qaeda and Afghanistan’s Taliban leadership”.140 As a 
matter of fact, it could be argued that today’s main use of armed drones in any 
theater is targeted killing.141
4. The right to life
When discussing the willful deprivation of the life of any individual 
committed by any Government, the first framework that should be taken 
into consideration is that of human rights and, in particular, the right to life. 
The right to a fair trial is also relevant, since often these people are killed 
after being unilaterally declared guilty of heinous crimes by in non-judicial 
instance and without any possibility of defending themselves.142 Due process 
and the right to life are acknowledged in all relevant international human 
rights instruments since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),143 
to which the United States, Israel, all EU members, and most states possessing 
or seeking drone technology are Parties.144
The right to life enunciated in Article 6 of the ICCPR “is the supreme 
right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency 
138. European RPAS Steering Group, supra note 9 at 12-13. An example of a festive, but potentially 
intrusive, use of drone technology is the video posted by the newspaper “La Vanguardia” 
of Barcelona covering the “Catalan Way” that about half a million individuals formed on 
Catalonia’s National Day of 2013 to claim for independence from Spain: La Vanguardia, “La 
Vía Catalana, captada por un dron desde el aire” (12 September 2013), online: <http://videos.
lavanguardia.com/politica/20130911/54382318522/la-via-catalana-captada-por-un-dron-desde-
el-aire.html> (last visited 2 July 2015).
139. Hazelton, supra note 7 at 30; UN, “Report of the Special Rapporteur” supra note 19 at para 79.
140. Shah, supra note 50 at 116.
141. Kramer, supra note 74 at 380.
142. Gross, supra note 121 at 324.
143. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, (no .14668) UNTS 999 
[entered into force 23 March 1976] [ICCPR] at art 6, 14-15.
144. The exception would be China. Status and Parties to the ICCPR can be found online: <http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en>.
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which threatens the life of the nation.”145 Nonetheless, it is not an absolute 
right: in spite of its “inherent” nature and the fact that life must be protected 
“by the law,” Article 6 of the ICCPR does not outlaw the death penalty.146 
What it basically prohibits are “arbitrary deprivations” of life of individuals 
by state agents, that is “extrajudicial executions, summary executions or 
assassinations, all of which are, by definition, illegal.”147 This duty to prevent 
arbitrary deprivation of life includes the “duty to prevent arbitrary killing 
by [the State’s] own security forces,” since “the deprivation of life by the 
authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost gravity.”148
Within this scope, “this right is a peremptory norm of international law 
and can never be suspended or otherwise derogated from.”149 Irrespective of 
the domestic situation that countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, 
or Yemen may be enduring, and irrespective of the threats that jihadist 
terrorism may pose to the US and other Western powers, the right to life is 
to be respected in all circumstances. Even dealing with a terrorist threat, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has affirmed that “the authorities 
were bound by their obligation to respect the right to life of the suspects to 
exercise the greatest of care in evaluating the information at their disposal 
before transmitting it to soldiers whose use of firearms automatically involved 
shooting to kill,”150 and found a violation of the right to life as it was “not 
persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the use of force 
which was no more than absolutely necessary.”151
Additionally, Article 2.1 of the ICCPR limits the scope of the treaty to 
individuals “within the territory and under the jurisdiction” of State parties.152 
Thus, territorial states consenting foreign action in their territory are clearly 
responsible for the violation of the right to life (as seen supra when discussing 
the limits of valid consent). But this cannot exclude the responsibility of the 
government performing the strike itself, since willfully depriving anyone’s life 
is an illegal action attributable to that State under Article 2 of the Draft Articles 
145. Human Rights Committee, “General Comment 6, article 6 (Sixteenth Session, 1982)” 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1982) at para 1.
146. The Protocol to the ICCPR banning the death penalty has a much lower number of State 
Parties than the Covenant itself. The US, Russia or Israel among others are not parties to it. But 
most European States are; and all members of the Council of Europe (again, except for Russia) 
are parties to Protocols 6 and 13 to the European Convention of Human Rights that abolish the 
death penalty in all circumstances.
147. UNHRC, “Report of the Special Rapporteur” supra note 18 at para 10.
148. Human Rights Committee, “General Comment 6” supra note 145 at para 3.
149. Amnesty International, supra note 5 at 43.
150. McCann and Others v UK (1995) 21 ECHR 97 GC at para 211.
151. Ibid. at para 213.
152. ICCPR, supra note 143 at art 2.1.
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on State Responsibility.153 Though some consider that it is “manifestly absurd” 
to stretch the ICCPR jurisdiction to include “violations of rights under the 
Covenant which State’s agents commit upon the territory of another State,”154 
other argue more rightly that under customary law and general principles of 
law, the obligation of states to refrain from arbitrary deprivation of life “does 
require that States refrain from deliberately infringing the right to life in their 
extraterritorial activities.”155
5. The legal framework of targeted killing
According to Alston, “[a] targeted killing is the intentional, premeditated 
and deliberate use of lethal force, by states or their agents acting under colour 
of law … against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of 
the perpetrator.”156 Gross proposes that “targeted killing consist[s] of, first, 
compiling lists of certain individuals who comprise specific threats and 
second, killing them when the opportunity presents itself.”157 The appraisal on 
the lawfulness of this practice must distinguish between times of peace and 
war, and maybe between international and non-international armed conflict.
In times of peace, targeted killing is equivalent to extrajudicial execution. 
It is true that the use of lethal force may be justifiable to combat crime, as 
long as it is absolutely necessary and proportional.158 As stated by Amnesty 
International, “[o]utside a situation of armed conflict, the US authorities 
must demonstrate, in each strike, that intentional lethal force was used when 
strictly unavoidable to protect life, no less harmful means such as capture or 
non-lethal incapacitation was possible, and the use of force was proportionate 
in the prevailing circumstances.”159 Rightful as they are, these words overlook 
the fact that targeted killing by drones is never improvised. Attacks do not 
“happen” by coincidence, in the midst of a “situation” where one can stop 
153. See Draft Articles, supra note 87 at art 2. As we shall discuss later, in the case of drone strikes 
all relevant agents that intervene in the decision making and execution process (the CIA, Special 
Operations, the US president…) are undoubtedly “State agents” under Draft Article 2.
154. Orr, supra note 131 at 746. He criticizes a decision of the Human Rights Committee 
in that respect.
155. Melzer, supra note 9 at 18. Discussing the concept of “jurisdiction” under international 
human rights law, and different cases under the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
(Alejandre) and the European Court of Human Rights (Bankovic), Melzer argues that it would be 
highly controversial to consider that collective and depersonalized acts of war might give rise to 
“jurisdiction” over the affected persons: “Conversely, it is much more likely that individualized 
operations, such as the deliberate killing of selected individuals through extraterritorial 
drone attacks, would be considered to bring the affected persons within the jurisdiction of the 
operating State.”
156. UNHRC, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” supra note 18 at para 1.
157. Gross, supra note 121 at 324.
158. UNHRC, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” supra note 18 at para 32; Gross, supra 
note 116 at 323.
159. Amnesty International, supra note 6 at 43.
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and reject a criminal act. Targeted killing implies an element of “intentional, 
premeditated, and deliberate killing by law enforcement officials,” that can 
simply never be lawful.160 As mentioned above, since terrorist strikes—even 
international or transnational—are not per se ‘armed attacks,’ any targeted 
killing committed by drones within the framework of a police action against 
terrorism must be labeled as an extrajudicial killing: “[w]ithout due process, 
named killings are nothing but extra-judicial execution and murder.”161
In time of war, be it international or non-international, the answer must 
be more nuanced. Obviously, the corollary of the principle of distinction is 
that it is lawful to kill “combatants.” In international conflicts, combatants are 
“members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict or participants in a levée 
en masse;”162 in non-international conflicts, “members of State armed forces 
or organized armed groups of a party to the conflict.”163 When combatants die or 
are wounded during hostilities, this is not “targeted killing,” because even if 
“lethal force” is used in an “intentional, premeditated, and deliberate” form, it 
is not addressed against a “specific individual.”.
Thus one of the issues at stake is whether it is lawful in time of war to 
kill a specific member of the enemy army outside a context of open hostilities; 
also, whether anyone can be targeted. Apparently, the answer would be yes: 
“[in] international armed conflict, combatants may be targeted at any time 
and any place (subject to the other requirements of IHL).”164 The last caveat 
(“subject to…”) is important and should be upgraded to international law in 
general, not just IHL. For instance, heads of State and government and foreign 
ministers enjoy full inviolability in all circumstances;165 it would be illegal to 
target them even if they are the ‘commanders-in-chief’ of their military. But 
beyond Alston’s precautions, his opinion, though clearly shared by a majority 
of authors,166 is far from unanimous. Other authors argue that “named killings” 
are prohibited in international humanitarian law as:
Soldiers are not criminals; they do not commit murder in the course of ordinary 
warfare nor can they be tried or incarcerated for their activities. At best, they 
160. UNHRC, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” supra note 18 at para 33.
161. Gross, supra note 116 at 325.
162. Nils Melzer, “Interpretative Guidance on the notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
under international humanitarian law” (ICRC: Geneva, May 2009) 20.
163. Ibid. at 27.
164. UNHRC, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” supra note 18 at para 58.
165. Case concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), 
[2002] ICJ Rep 22 at para 54:
The Court accordingly concludes that the functions of a Minister for Foreign Affairs [even 
more, therefore, a head of state] are such that, throughout the duration of his or her office, 
he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability. 
That immunity and that inviolability protect the individual concerned against any act of authority 
of another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of his or her duties.
166. Dworkin, supra note 37 at 748.
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are agents of the states whose interests they fight to defend. Even in the worst 
of cases, when these states are blatant aggressors, soldiers retain a measure 
of innocence on the assumption that many may have been conscripted or, 
however misguided, believe in the justice of their cause.167
In an intermediate position, Melzer argues that humanitarian law “neither 
provides an express right to kill, nor does it impose a general obligation to 
capture rather than kill,”168 but in any case “the fact alone that a capture 
operation would be impossible or fraught with unacceptable risk does not 
turn an otherwise protected civilian into a legitimate military target subject 
to lawful attack.”169 Still in the view of others, the “right to kill” is limited to 
individuals having military operational roles in the armed group:
Individuals who accompany or support an organized armed group, but 
whose activities are unrelated to military operations, are not lawful military 
targets under the laws of war. Thus members of an armed group who play 
a political role or a non-military logistics function cannot be targeted on 
that basis alone.170
If it is at least doubtful that targeted or named killing is an option in a 
context of an international war, the same prudence must apply to non-inter-
national armed conflicts. Since in that context the very notion of “combatant” 
does not exist, at least on the side of the “rebels,” only individuals who 
participate directly in hostilities and are members of an armed group who 
have a “continuous combat function” would be targetable at all times and in 
all places.171 Alston has criticized the concept of “continuous combat function,” 
as it determines a questionable status “given the specific treaty language that 
limits direct participation to ‘for such time’ as opposed to ‘all the time.’”172 
Besides, the very notions of direct participation in hostilities and of continuous 
combat functions have grey areas, in spite of the notable efforts of the ICRC to 
define them with precision.173
6. A legal assessment of the use of drones for targeted killing in practice
Let us see now how the above legal framework compares to reality. 
As discussed earlier, in order to justify targeted killings with drones the US 
claims to be at war, be it assisting a local Government in a non-international 
167. Gross, supra note 121 at 326.
168. Melzer, supra note 8 at 28.
169. Ibid. at 29.
170. Human Rights Watch, supra note 69 at 86.
171. Melzer, supra note 153 at 66.
172. UNHRC, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” supra note 18 at para 65.
173. Melzer, supra note 155 at 43-68.
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armed conflict or fighting terrorism in the War on Terror.174 As far as we 
know, the main theaters where drones are being used for targeted killing 
are Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen.175 None of these states 
participates in an international armed conflict nor does US military support 
or presence transform their conflicts in international ones, since the US is not 
at war with any of these governments. In these theaters, both a civil agency 
and the military of the US are gathering intelligence, defining and carrying 
out targeted killings with remotely-piloted aircraft systems.176 Other countries 
are known to have performed targeted killings (Russia, Sri Lanka), but only 
Israel,177 and the United Kingdom,178 have joined the US in using drones 
for such purpose.
Afghanistan and Somalia should be objectively considered to be in a 
situation of non-international armed conflict, with the US giving explicit 
support to both governments, particularly the Afghan one.179 Pakistan and 
Yemen are not, although in the first case, some fighting derived from the Afghan 
war may occur in its territory,180 while the second case is controversial:181 
it can be argued that fighting between the Yemeni government and al-Qaeda 
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has reached the level of an armed conflict,182 
174. Dworkin, supra note 37 at 4-6.
175. We have mentioned strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan in other sections of this article. As 
for the acknowledgement of drone action in Somalia and Yemen, see Adam Entous, “The US 
Acknowledges its Drone Strikes” The Wall Street Journal (15 June 2012) online: <http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303410404577468981916011456.html> (last visited 2 July 
2015). For data on strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia see The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism, supra note 7.
176. Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, & Knuckey, supra 25 at 14.
177. UNHRC, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” supra note 18 at paras 7, 14; Webb, Wirbel, & 
Sulzman, supra note 11, at 32.
178. Cole, Dobbing, & Hailwood, supra note 47 at 13. Their report confirms that British drones 
have fired their weapons, though it does not indicate that it has necessarily engaged in “targeted 
killings” with drones.
179. In Afghanistan, the fighting “between US forces (allied with Afghan government forces) and 
the Taliban meets de criteria for non-international armed conflict” (Amnesty International, supra 
note 5 at 45). In the case of Somalia, it is a non-international armed conflict that does not meet 
the demanding requirements of Art 1 of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions.
180. According to Amnesty International, “this would be the case if a drone strike targets a Taliban 
fighter in North Waziristan who is directly participating in the non-international armed conflict 
in Afghanistan (to which the USA is a party).” See ibid. at 44.
181. See The International Crisis Group acknowledging nonetheless the violent conflicts with 
the separatist South and with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP): International Crisis 
Group, “Yemen: Enduring Conflicts, Threatened Transition” (3 July 2012), online: <http://www.
crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/yemen/125-yemen-enduring-
conflicts-threatened-transition.aspx> (last visited 2 July 2015).
182. Some authors argue that there clearly is a non-international armed conflict between the 
Yemeni Government, supported by the US, and AQAP; see Benjamin R. Farley, “Targeting 
Anwar Al-Aulaqi: A Case Study in US Drone Strikes and Targeted Killing,” (2012) 2 American 
University National Security Law Brief 57, at 64-69.
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but even then the US government “has not claimed to be a party alongside 
the Yemeni government to the Yemen-AQAP conflict. [President] Obama 
has said instead that the US does not carry out attacks against individuals in 
Yemen unless they pose a direct threat to the United States or its interests.”183 
Thus, in Pakistan and Yemen the US is ostensibly carrying out “police” or 
“enforcement” actions, not military ones.
Current practice in targeted killing with drones in the above theaters 
includes “signature strikes” and “follow-up strikes.”184 There are also “kill 
lists” (or “personality strikes”) prepared by intelligence services.185
Signature strikes are based on “pattern of life analysis” and it is particularly 
worrisome that the Obama administration has engaged for years in this 
policy,186 especially in the two theaters that do not meet the threshold of an 
“armed conflict” situation:
It has been widely reported that in both Pakistan and Yemen the US has at 
times carried out ‘signature strikes’ or ‘Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes’ in 
which groups are targeted based not on knowledge of their identity but on a pattern 
of behavior that complies with a set of indicators for militant activity.187
Thus, if you are a bearded male of 18-50 years of age, living in the FATA or 
other areas and behaving in a “suspicious” way(whatever that means) you are 
the ideal candidate to suffer a drone strike.188 Needless to say, in no case does 
international law, in time of peace or war, allow the targeting of individuals 
“based on the mere suspicion that they may qualify as a legitimate military 
target.”189 Thus, these strikes violate the right to life,190 and may constitute a 
war crime.191 Signature strikes are illegal in any imaginable framework.
The alternative to signature strikes are “personality strikes” that started 
during the Bush administration and focus targeted killings on named, allegedly 
high-value leaders of al Qaida or other groups.192 As stated earlier, most 
authors agree that killing specific individuals in a war context (international or 
183. Human Rights Watch, supra note 70 at 83.
184. Melzer, supra note 8 at 34-35.
185. Amnesty International, supra note 5 at 46 and 49.
186. Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, & Knuckey, supra note 25 at 12.
187. Dworkin, supra note 37 at 6.
188. The Fact Sheet produced by the White House immediately after Obama’s speech in May 
2013 shows a clear improvement in this situation when it states that “it is not the case that 
all military-aged males in the vicinity of a target are deemed to be combatants.” See Office of 
the Press Secretary, US Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism 
Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities (Fact Sheet) (Washington, DC: 
The White House, 2013), online: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/
fact-sheet-us-policy-standards-and-procedures-use-force-counterterrorism>.
189. Melzer, supra note 8 at 24.
190. Ibid. at 36.
191. Ibid. at 34. Or, rather, a crime against humanity.
192. Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey, supra note 25 at 12.
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not) is lawful. Everyone, including US officials, agrees that the United States 
is not at war against any of the countries on which territories drones are being 
used. But more importantly, the United States is not at “war” with al-Qaeda, 
because governments do not wage wars against terrorist groups, at least not 
in the legal sense. The idea dropped by President Obama that “in the not-too-
distant future … the fight against the al-Qaeda network will no longer qualify 
as an armed conflict”193 has a crucial flaw: in the eyes of the rest of the world, 
it has never qualified as such. Thus only in situations where the US is assisting 
a government fighting a non-international armed conflict, it may be arguably 
legal for it to target “at any time” civilians who perform “continuous combat 
functions.” This is clearly not the case of Pakistan, where more than 80 per cent 
of all US drone strikes have taken place.194
And then, even in armed conflict situations, it is arguable whether all 
or most of the US targeted strikes meet the IHL requirements. Apparently, 
the CIA and the US Special Operations Command provide their own target 
lists, which are obtained through independent, parallel processes, though 
they often overlap.195 According to the media, President Obama supervises 
and authorizes each decision.196 But then again, the fact that most targeted 
killing are decided by the CIA is worrisome: “unlike a State’s armed forces, 
its intelligence agents do not generally operate within a framework which 
places appropriate emphasis upon ensuring compliance with IHL, rendering 
violations more likely.”197 In fact, personality strikes are premeditated killings 
that imply that no case-by-case analysis is being done of “whether those 
persons are taking direct part in hostilities at the time they are targeted.”198
The CIA’s overwhelming implication in this affair leads us to another 
reflection, paraphrasing Gross: “only the target’s suspected criminal behavior 
justifies recourse to informers and collaborators”199 (thus, intelligence, as that 
193. Paraphrased by Dworkin, supra note 37 at 7. In this respect, it is worrisome that the Human 
Rights Watch report says that “It is not evident that the US remains in an armed conflict with 
either Al-Qaeda or AQAP as defined by international humanitarian law.” See Human Rights 
Watch, supra note 174, at 91. This “remains” implicitly assumes that at some time the US was 
indeed in war against this terrorist organization in a legal sense, even if the organization affirms 
that this is not the case nowadays.
194. See data at the site of The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, supra note 6. Estimates as at 31 
August 2013 calculate up to 373 attacks in Pakistan since 2004, 64 in Yemen since 2002, and 9 in 
Somalia since 2007.
195. Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, & Knuckey, supra note 25 at 14.
196. See “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will” The New York Times (29 
May 2012), online: <http://nyti.ms/1DMdcJr> (last visited 2 July 2015). The fact that the President 
has the final say on this issue tries to cover the “war framework” that the US wants to give to 
these strikes, since the US President is the commander-in-chief of the US armed forces according 
to art II, s 2 of the US Constitution.
197. UNHRC, “Report of the Special Rapporteur,” supra note 18 at para 22.
198. Amnesty International, supra note 5 at 46.
199. Gross, supra note 121 at 326.
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provided by the CIA); “this argument reverts to the logic of law enforcement” 
rather than to the paradigm of “conventional war.”200 And in the context of law 
enforcement, “individuals cannot be targeted for lethal attack merely because 
of past unlawful behavior, but only for imminent or other grave threats to 
life when arrest is not a reasonable possibility.”201 As asserted by Amnesty 
International, “making the civilian population or individual civilians not 
taking direct part in hostilities the object of an attack is a war crime.”202
The more recent US policy on the use of lethal force outside areas of 
active hostilities does not dispel the concerns raised above.203 Stating that 
lethal force will only be used when capture is not feasible and no other 
reasonable alternatives exist to address the threat [against Americans ] raises 
at least doubts on which threshold the US will establish to determine the lack 
of feasibility of capture, the existence or not of alternatives and the reality, 
gravity, and imminence of a specific threat.204 Immediately before and after the 
disclosure of this policy:
The US government interpretation appeared to allow the killing of an 
individual in the absence of any intelligence about the specific planned 
attack, or the individual’s personal involvement in planning or carrying out a 
specific attack. It stretched the concept of imminence well beyond its ordinary 
meaning and established interpretations under the existing international law 
on the right of states to self-defense.205
Needless to say, other alleged practices such as “follow-up strikes”, 
that is, conducting second attacks on wounded survivors of first attacks,206 
or deliberately targeting rescuers at the scene of a previous drone strike,207 
should constitute a war crime (if in war context, by principle of distinction) or 
otherwise an assassination.
200. Ibid.
201. Human Rights Watch, supra note 69 at 87.
202. Amnesty International, supra note 5 at 46.
203. All we know about this policy is what President Obama announced in his May 2013 
speech and the “fact sheet” produced by the White House the same day; supra note 188. Both 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have considered insufficient this disclosure 
of information. Amnesty has formally asked the Administration to publicize the whole of the 
Policy Standards. See Human Rights Watch, supra note 69 at 89; Amnesty International, supra 
note 5 at 51-52.
204. Dworkin, supra note 37 at 6.
205. Amnesty International, supra note 5 at 52.
206. Melzer, supra note 8 at 35.
207. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “Bureau investigation finds fresh evidence of 
CIA drone strikes on rescuers” (1 August 2013), online: <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.
com/2013/08/01/bureau-investigation-finds-fresh-evidence-of-cia-drone-strikes-on-rescuers/> 
(last visited 12 June 2014).
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V. FINAL REMARKS
Drones are unmanned aircraft, controlled remotely and in real time by 
human operators that serve multiple purposes, both peaceful and military. 
This article has focused its research on military drones that perform armed 
strikes, particularly against suspects of jihadism. As a military technology that 
is relatively new, their use has attracted the attention of scholars and the media 
on grounds of ethical, legal, and political soundness. Amnesty International 
has argued that the use of armed drones should be analyzed on a case-by-case 
basis, that it impossible to give general answers,208 and we agree that each and 
every drone strike should be scrutinized and evaluated against human rights 
and international humanitarian law. Unfortunately, the lack of transparency 
makes this scrutiny unfeasible.209 In the absence of a case-by-case analysis, 
however, some general considerations can be made.
The issue with drones is how they are used, at least in three areas: 
infringement of national sovereignty; respect of the laws of war; and respect 
of international human rights. In the first of these areas, beyond national 
jurisdiction, remotely-piloted aircraft (civil or military) can only fly over 
sovereign territories with the clear and valid consent of the State. If this 
consent exists, which could be the case of Afghanistan and Yemen, but not 
Pakistan, let alone Somalia, the local government would be co-responsible 
of the eventual infringements of international law attributable to the country 
operating the drones. On the other hand, drones can be used in self-defense, 
just like any other weapon, but only as long as they are used in an immediate, 
proportionate and necessary response to an armed attack attributable to a 
State, which are requirements that the ‘War on Terror’ does not meet.
When employed as means of warfare, the principle of distinction, the 
prohibition of perfidy, and other jus in bello norms apply to these weapons 
as they do to any other, but not more than to any other. Our first assessment 
is that, from an international legal perspective, armed drone technology is 
not and cannot be per se forbidden. However, if empirical evidence was to 
show that their raison d’être is targeted killing and that they are used more 
often than not in a way that necessarily violates basic principles of international 
humanitarian law, we may need to come back to and review this assertion. 
In the same line of thought, drones may perform military functions, but they 
should not be used in a way that terrorizes the civil population by flying 
constantly, threatening to launch an armed attack at any unexpected time.
Armed drones can be used in the midst of hostilities, but it is at least 
questionable that they target specific civilians that have risen against a 
foreign government. Clearly, armed drones cannot premeditatedly target 
and kill presumed terrorists. In international human rights law, it is always 
208. Amnesty International, supra note 5 at 44; and Orr, supra note 104 at 733.
209. Amnesty International, supra note 5 at 49; and Kramer, supra note 62 at 378.
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unlawful to target individuals based on the mere suspicion that they may have 
committed a crime in the past or may do so sometime in the future. Armed 
drones have become the weapon of choice in the fight of the US, with other 
powers potentially following, against international jihadist terrorism, in the 
form of “targeted” or “named” killing. The legal defense of these acts is based 
on the foul premise that there is a global ‘war’ against terrorism. Certainly, 
the line between terrorism and armed force may have become thinner in the 
last decades, but they are still distinct (il)legal activities,210 that imply different 
legal consequences. If we are ready to cross the line that separates the use 
of force and law enforcement, then it should be with all consequences. For 
instance, if “self-defense” is to be admissible against terrorist groups, this 
should imply that these groups have launched a prior or immediate “armed 
attack” (since self-defense is only permitted in such cases, according to Article 
51 of the UN Charter).211 Thus, for the sake of consistency, we would have 
to accept that they have used “armed force,”212 which would imply that 
international humanitarian law would be fully applicable to both parties. 
This finally would mean, among many other things, that captured terrorists 
would have to be considered prisoners of war, not just criminals. And if there 
is a “Global War on Terror,” the drone operators based in US territory, some 
of which are civilians, would become “legal targets of attack as DPH (direct 
participation in hostilities).”213 If we support the idea that civilians performing 
“continuous combat functions” are targetable “at any time,” then these drone 
operators would also be, not only while they are “working,”, but also when 
they commute to and from the office, for instance.
It is unlikely that any of the above consequences of a consistent 
interpretation of the current use of armed drones in the four main theaters 
where they have been employed by the United States would satisfy the powers 
that possess this technology. Thus, in being consistent it is in the best interest of 
the US and other powers to restrain their use of armed drones to frameworks 
of actual armed conflict and hostilities, against legitimate enemy combatants, 
and with due respect of the basic principles of international humanitarian law.
210. Hans Corell, “Human Rights, Rule of Law, Under Threat After 9/11,” (2013) International 
Judicial Monitor 1 at 1.
211. UN Charter, supra note 127 at art 51.
212. In principle, this would be an illegal use of force. Obviously, they would not be authorized 
by the Security Council to use force. But, could they claim that they are the ones acting in 
self-defense? If one accepts the exotic argument that States can be at “war” with non-state 
entities, this should work both ways and accept that not only these actors can “attack” States, 
but that they can be the object of an “aggression” and thus have the right to defend themselves. 
Does this make any sense? In any case, be it lawful or not, international humanitarian law 
applies to all “armed conflicts.”
213. Kramer, supra note 74 at 389.
